The next Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz, has placed European pigeons flying in circles when He suggested Last month, which given the growing mistrust of President Trump’s commitment to NATO, he wanted to speak to France and Great Britain to extend nuclear deterrence on Germany.
Warning that an “deep change in American geopolitics” had put Poland, as well as Ukraine, in an “objectively more difficult situation”, Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland suggested the same thing, while alluding to this Poland, with his long history of Russian occupation, could possibly develop his own bomb.
Then, the president of Poland, Andrzej Duda, said this week that it was time for the United States to consider redeploying some of his nuclear weapons from Western Europe to Poland. “I think it’s not only that the time has come, but that it would be safer that these weapons are already there,” MM Duda said Financial time.
The tumult has been immediate, given the sensitivity and complications of the nuclear problem and the whole concept of prolonged deterrence – the will of a country with nuclear arms to use its nuclear weapons to defend a non -nuclear ally. This commitment is at the heart of article five of NATO, promising a collective defense and depends on the massive American nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Trump and his officials Say that they remain committed To extend the American nuclear umbrella above Europe, the vital deterrence of any serious Russian aggression and the alliance itself. But his obvious hostility towards Europe has so upset the traditional American European allies which he caused strong doubts that they can depend on the United States.
There are fears that talking too much about a European replacement, and even less trying to build one, only encourages Trump to withdraw his commitment. Despite this, European allies are now engaged in the most serious debate of generations on what the nuclear defense of Europe should be.
Like many things with regard to European defense, the replacement of American engagement would not be easy.
Today, France and Great Britain are the only two Western powers in Europe to have nuclear weapons. For others, like Germany, joining the nuclear club would cost expensive, would require leaving the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and could seem more threatening for Moscow, increasing the risks rather than lowering them.
But together, the French and the British only have 500 warheads, against around 3,700 in the American arsenal, with around 1300 other expectations of being deactivated. Americans also have what is called “triad” – nuclear weapons on terrestrial missiles, bombers and submarines.
The French have no terrestrial missiles but have bombers and nuclear equipped submarines, while the British have only submarines.
And only the French nuclear arsenal is really independent of the United States, technically and politically. France has always refused to join the NATO nuclear planning group, keeping the sole authority about the use of its weapons in the hands of the French president, currently Emmanuel Macron.
British deterrence depends on the American missiles Trident II, launching and maintenance mechanisms, which at least raises the question of whether the British government has the power to launch these weapons.
French doctrine has always been a little vague, part of uncertainty which is the heart of deterrence. “We have a fairly good idea of what the French will not do, but not such a clear understanding of what they are ready to do,” said Claudia Major, head of transatlantic security studies for the German Fund Marshall.
Since 2020, Mr. Macron has sometimes talked about the vital national interests of France as having “a European dimension”, without specifying what it is. Earlier this month, he announced a “strategic debate on the use of our deterrence to protect our allies on the European continent”.
“But how far is this” European dimension “? Ms. Major asked. “The French will not define it and of course do not want Russia to know.”
The security of neighboring Germany and perhaps Poland would probably be considered as French national vital interests, said Erik Jones, director of the Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute.
But it is far from clear that a rapid conventional Russian attack against Estonia or Lithuania would encourage a French threat or nuclear response. “The vital interests of France do not reach as far,” he said.
French nuclear deterrence is not intended to ensure prolonged deterrent in cheap American style, said Camille Grand, a former French defense official and NATO. But it provides another degree of uncertainty in Moscow which completes and even strengthens NATO nuclear policy, he said.
Since France and Great Britain are European, their national interests are more likely to extend to the European district than what is the case for the distant United States, made Mr. Grand.
Then there is the question of the next French president. If it is Marine Le Pen, head of the far -right national rally, she could have a closer vision of French interests. This could undermine the credibility of a French nuclear deterrence extended in the same way that Europeans have become anxious in the face of Mr. Trump’s commitment.
However, with bombers and submarines, France maintains a “climbing scale”, with the ability to threaten use without doing it. For example, in February 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, France put a third nuclear submarine at sea, “a calm but explicit message that the Russians have seen,” said Mr. Grand.
As Mr. Merz and Polish leaders have suggested, France could also consider “nuclear sharing”, as the Americans do. There are five European countries – Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey – which are currently hosting American nuclear bombs B61 and have their own planes to deliver them.
Poland would like to be a sixth. While the French bombers accessible to nuclear have been supplied by Italy, for example, so that France decides to place some of its nuclear weapons and bombers in other countries would be a break with its current doctrine. In any case, France and its president would retain total control of their use.
The submarines in themselves do not provide an climbing scale, because they are supposed to remain hidden, and the fire missiles or do not. This is one of the reasons why British officials plan to restore the air leg of their deterrence. Ideally, the British would also benefit from another nuclear support submarine, so more than one can be at sea. But the expenses are enormous.
And there is no way to share a submarine with another country, how a bomb or missile launched by air can be shared.
In the end, the heart of NATO’s nuclear deterrence remains the United States, said Ivo Daalder, a former US NATO ambassador.
The question for him is less the number of warheads than the credibility of deterrence. “How to make a deterrent against credible Russia when you are an ocean and convince allies that you are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice for them?” He asked. “Unfortunately, Trump answers these questions without even raising them.”
Given all uncertainty, Germany may have to become nuclear itself, said Thorsten Benner, director of the Global Public Policy Institute. “So far, talking about a German bomb has been limited to the types of fringes, but now it becomes more common,” he said. But he prefers to discuss nuclear sharing with France, with French bombers on German bases.
Matthew Kroenig, a former Defense Ministry official who heads the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security to the Atlantic Council, thinks that the debate was beneficial for Europeans to defend more seriously.
“NATO allies should do many more nuts and bolts of conventional defense, but high-end things like nuclear deterrence-only the United States can provide,” he said.
Ms. Major has another concern, widely shared. “The more we do for the defense, the better for us,” she said. “But does that send the bad signal and does he have the involuntary consequence of the departure of America?” This is the decoupling argument that we fear so much. »»
